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Abstract
The “exemplifĳication theory of history” is proposed to account for the relationship 
between the past and historical narratives. The theory states that what belongs to 
the past according to some narrative does so in order to exemplify the historical 
thesis of that narrative. As such the theory explains how the past receives its mean-
ing. This implies that the past has no intrinsic historical meaning itself. Moreover, 
it follows that historical narratives possess an autonomy of their own with regard 
to the past. It is argued that the exemplifĳication theory of history goes to the heart 
of narrativist philosophy of history. This claim is supported by the key arguments 
of three narrativist philosophers: Arthur Danto, Louis Mink and Frank Ankersmit. 
The distinction between the history of social individuals (“states”, “poverty”, “Thirty 
Years War”) and the identifĳication of such individuals turns out to be fundamental 
in this respect. The article concludes by distinguishing between a Platonic and an 
Aristotelian view on narrative and by explaining why we ought to prefer the for-
mer to the latter. 
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In her excellent study The Triumph of Pleasure. Louis XIV & the Politics of 
Spectacle, Georgia J. Cowart sets herself the task “to reveal the forces that 
efffectively transformed the celebration of the monarch into the utopian 
celebration of public entertainment as a new societal model”.1 This new, 
1) G. Cowart, The Triumph of Pleasure. Louis XIV & the Politics of Spectacle (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, Chicago 2008), xv.
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libertine societal model, emerging in the late seventeenth century, was 
based on the ideals of love, social harmony, equality, and freedom. If it 
would come into being, pleasure would triumph. On the painter Antoine 
Watteau she writes:
his Pilgrimage to Cythera, based directly on the imagery and ideology of two 
ballets produced at the Opéra and related works at the théâtre de la foire, may 
be seen as the most complete expression of an operatic, proto-Enlightenment 
vision of an alternative, utopian society.2 
This meaning of Watteau’s painting, painted in 1717–1718, goes beyond Wat-
teau’s intentions for obvious reasons. Watteau, as any other mortal, could 
not have foreseen the future, even if the Enlightenment was about to unfold 
right in front of him. He may have intended to express a vision of an alter-
native society; he may even have intended to anticipate what was about to 
come: that would make him in retrospect a visionary; but he could not have 
intended to anticipate what was later to be known as the Enlightenment. 
For only after the events we have learned to associate with the Enlighten-
ment took place did it make sense to speak of a proto-Enlightenment. Sim-
ilarly, philosophers living before Socrates could not have called themselves 
“Pre-Socratic philosophers”. Those of us who are familiar with Arthur 
Danto’s Analytical Philosophy of History will have other examples ready at 
hand.
Maybe we should ask Cowart to change her language and ask her to dis-
cuss the past in its own terms only (it self-evidently would make no sense 
in this context to ask her to re-consider her research). For should the histo-
rian not confĳine herself to making statements that contemporaries of the 
events could have made? All historians need to do – and this is a task difffĳi-
cult enough already – is to help establish a complete inventory of the past: 
a record of all that has happened in the past. 
The idea of a complete inventory of the past is discussed by Danto. He 
calls it the Ideal Chronicle.3 It is a list of all events in the past in their chron-
ological order, stating absolutely everything about it, including the experi-
ences and observations of contemporaries. Such complete inventory would 
2) Cowart, The Triumph of Pleasure, xviii.
3) A.C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 146–
149. This book includes the integral text of Analytical Philosophy of History.
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thus fulfĳil the dreams of Leopold von Ranke and the like and show the past 
in itself, wie es eigentlich gewesen. The Ideal Chronicle has, however, as 
Danto points out, one important and decisive shortcoming: it does not con-
tain any information on the later events that some events can be connected 
with. After all, the Ideal Chronicle only contains descriptions of events that 
could have been made at the time of their occurrence. It follows that, fĳirst, 
the description of the state of afffairs at t-1 as it is in itself – assuming there 
is such a thing – will always be incomplete since that state of afffairs can 
always be re-described in terms of states of afffairs later in time. Second, the 
re-description of the state of afffairs at t-1 in terms of the state of afffairs at t-2 
requires both states of afffairs to have occurred. Finally, such re-descriptions, 
Danto calls them narrative sentences, cannot be part of the inventory of the 
past made by the Ideal Chronicler. For the state of afffairs at t-1 described by 
the Ideal Chronicler at t-1 cannot be described in terms of some state of 
afffairs at t-2 since at t-1 the state of afffairs at t-2 had not yet occurred. So 
Adrian Haddock misunderstood Danto when writing that descriptions of 
actions are narrative sentences that the Ideal Chronicler cannot make use 
of.4 “Jones was planting a rose” is not a narrative sentence: its truth only 
requires the fĳirst event (the planting) and not the second and later event 
(the seedling having grown into a rose) to have taken place. The sentence 
“Jones was planting a prize-winning rose”, on the other hand, is a narrative 
sentence, since both the second (winning the prize) and the fĳirst event 
(planting the rose) must have occurred for the sentence to be true.5 
The inventory of the past contains all descriptions of a state of afffairs 
that could be made at the time of its occurrence. Such descriptions, how-
ever, will not be historical descriptions. For to know the historical meaning 
or signifĳicance of an event, Danto argues, “It will be necessary to know 
which future events are relevant, and this requires predicting the interests 
of future historians.”6 Of course, past events had a meaning for those living 
through those events. But the historical meaning of past events is only for 
historians to see. The past has no intrinsic historical meaning.
So we should not ask Cowart to change her language: we should reflect 
on it. According to Frank Ankersmit, all that is relevant in the philosophy of 
history is to be found in the distinction between descriptions of the past as 
4) A. Haddock, “Danto’s Dialectic”, Philosophia (2008), 483–493, there 489.
5) Danto, Narration, 164–165.
6) Danto, Narration, 169.
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they can be found in the Ideal Chronicle and the retrospective understanding 
of the historian.7 The exemplifĳication theory of history proposed here is a 
theory about that distinction. 
According to the exemplifĳication theory of history, the past has no intrin-
sic historical meaning. The past receives its meaning by exemplifying a gen-
eral thesis about the past. Historical theses are sometimes described as 
offfering “perspectives on the past” or as the “conclusions” reached by histo-
rians. The emergent proto-Enlightenment in the late seventeenth century, 
emphasizing, among other things, social harmony, equality, and the wish 
to participate in the pleasures and manners of what was then known as 
noble gallantry, is such historical thesis. The past states of afffairs mentioned 
in Cowart’s narrative, Watteau’s painting for instance, can be said to exem-
plify this thesis. The past has no intrinsic historical meaning: it “only” has a 
meaning in terms of the historical thesis that it exemplifĳies. It follows that 
the historical narrative expressing such thesis is autonomous with regard 
to the past.
The exemplifĳication theory and that of the autonomy of historical narra-
tive will bring us to the heart of narrativist philosophy of history. Support for 
both (obviously closely related) theories will be found in the work of Danto, 
Mink, and Ankersmit. These three narrativist philosophers of history all 
emphasize the autonomy of historical narratives. Moreover, all the three of 
them use notions coming close to what I have called “exemplifĳication”.8 Fur-
thermore, the distinction between the history of parts of social reality (as 
expressed in a narrative) and the identifĳication of those parts of social reality 
7) F.R. Ankersmit, “Danto, History, And the Tragedy of Human Existence”, History and The-
ory 42, (2003), 291–304, there 298.
8) The concept “exemplifĳication” is well known from Nelson Goodman’s philosophy of sym-
bols. A tailor’s swatch functions as a sample and as such it exemplifĳies certain properties 
(Goodman, Languages of Art. An Approach to A Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis and Cam-
bridge: Hackett Publishing, 1976), 53). A swatch only exemplifĳies some of the properties it 
has. It will for example not exemplify a certain shape. This notion of exemplifĳication is dif-
ferent from what I have in mind in the following respect. I will argue that aspects of the past 
exemplify certain properties after being historically understood. Watteau does not exem-
plify the proto-Enlightenment because he is a proto-Enlightenment painter (and thus can 
be attributed the property of being such a person). Only after being historically understood 
(i.e. in terms of later events he is connected with) does Watteau exemplify the proto-
Enlightenment. Watteau thus only in retrospect acquires the property of being a proto-
Enlightenment painter.
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is basic to their philosophies of history. Finally, as Ankersmit argues, and 
this is supported by the analysis of Danto and Mink, the identifĳication of 
some part of social reality is made possible by having the history of that part. 
Historicity precedes identifĳication. 
Narrativist philosophy of history as advocated by Danto, Mink, and Ank-
ersmit, can be characterized as “Platonic”; its rival, the narrativist philoso-
phy of authors such as Carr and Ricoeur, as “Aristotelian”. The Aristotelians 
deny the autonomy of historical understanding. This article concludes with 
giving some strong reasons why we should prefer the Platonic view on nar-
rative to its Aristotelian competitor. 
1. Danto: Social Change and the Making of History
When Danto discusses sentences stating a fact about the past, he distin-
guishes at some point between sentences referring to human beings, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, sentences referring to what he calls “social 
individuals” such as social classes, groups, large-scale events such as the 
Thirty Years War, and large-scale social movements such as the Reforma-
tion.9 No one in his right mind would deny that both statements referring 
to individual human beings and statements referring to social individuals 
are indispensable ingredients of historical narratives. However, the distinc-
tion does give rise to some important problems. One such problem is 
whether there really are such things as social individuals. If one denies that 
social individuals exist, one can still admit historical sentences on social 
individuals to be valuable or even indispensable for historical writing. For 
it might be argued that such statements simply state something about the 
individual human beings of which the social individual consists that can-
not be stated by referring to those individual human beings individually. 
Apart from this problem, there is a second, more pressing one we should 
attend to. It is best addressed by taking into consideration Danto’s treat-
ment of Wedgwood’s narrative of the Thirty Years War. Discussing this sec-
ond problem will also provide us with an answer to the former.
The central issue discussed by Wedgwood that Danto draws our atten-
tion to is the change of the Thirty Years War from a primarily religious con-
flict into a political one. Danto fĳirst asks himself the question how in a 
9) Danto, Narration, 258.
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description of this change reference is made to individuals (we shall leave 
the question whether the Thirty Years War was changing itself or whether 
the change happened in or during the Thirty Years War unanswered for the 
moment). His answer to this question is important in the context of our 
present discussion. Danto fĳirst points out that when Wedgwood refers to 
individuals, she does so mainly to “illustrate this change” or “to provide evi-
dence that a change has in fact taken place”. (There is of course a diffference 
between illustrating and providing evidence, a diffference I will attend to 
below. For now let us merely follow Danto’s own analysis.) After this initial 
observation, Danto goes on to argue that the mentioned individual human 
beings are selected for a special reason. They are not selected because of 
their intrinsic interest, but because of the historical signifĳicance that can be 
attributed to them. For they “make clear to us that a great change in attitude 
and behaviour of individuals in roughly the same social positions has taken 
place”.10 Here we begin to understand that the past has an historical mean-
ing only in terms of the narrative that is written about it. The past states of 
afffairs mentioned in some narrative are not mentioned because of their 
intrinsic interest; they are mentioned because of their illustrative use.
Danto’s analysis does not stop here. He furthermore points out that the 
change of the conflict from a primarily religious conflict to a political con-
flict was not something that was intended. No one knows in advance the 
signifĳicance of what one is doing or living through – though speculations 
can of course always be made. Moreover, the change “may not have been 
reproduced within the biography of any single individual who lived through 
the change”, for “the change took place, not in individuals, but in society”. 
Social changes are according to Danto not observable as such. Not because 
the past is by defĳinition unobservable since it is no longer present (unless 
we would have a time machine), but because only the behaviour and atti-
tude of individuals can be the proper object of observation.11 Furthermore, 
and this is central to Danto’s philosophy of history as a whole, individuals 
cannot view their action from the perspective of the historian. Only when 
the present has become past is it possible for actions to acquire historical 
signifĳicance. It is up to the historian to fĳind out what later events some 
action or other event is connected with: 
10) Danto, Narration, 262–263.
11)   Danto, Narration, 263–264.
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To ask for the signifĳicance of an event, in the historical sense of the term, is to 
ask a question which can be answered only in the context of a story. The iden-
tical event will have a diffferent signifĳicance in accordance with the story in 
which it is located or, in other words, in accordance with what diffferent sets of 
later events it may be connected.12 
Finding out the historical signifĳicance of events is “the work of historians: 
history is made by them”.13 The historical meaning of an event depends on 
the narrative it is part of. This is the fĳirst step in understanding the proposi-
tion that events in narratives function as examples of the historical thesis 
expressed in that narrative. We may now also understand what narrativist 
philosophers of history have in mind with the autonomy of historical nar-
ratives: history is made by historians and not something that can be found 
in the past. It is the product of their retrospective understanding.
We may now come to the following somewhat surprising conclusion 
when combining Danto’s analysis of social change with his emphasis on the 
retrospective view of the historian: past states of afffairs receive a historical 
meaning by illustrating a social change that as such cannot be found in the 
past itself. Thus Cowart uses individuals and their libertine behaviour and 
beliefs to illustrate what she calls the proto-Enlightenment vision of a uto-
pian society. This proto-Enlightenment cannot be found in the past itself. 
Social changes do not take place in individuals but in society, as Danto con-
tended. Now, we may still hold that societies are to be found in the past 
itself, but their histories are not. Only in retrospect does a past state of afffair 
acquire historical signifĳicance. The historian’s hindsight is a conditio sine 
qua non of the writing of history. For only afterwards, when a period is over, 
is it possible to become aware of what defĳines that period as a period. This 
is the Hegelian gist of Danto’s narrativist philosophy of history.14 
12) Danto, Narration, 11.
13) Danto, Narration, 284.
14) On this Hegelian gist in Danto, see also Ankersmit, “Danto, History”, 300–303. David Carr 
complaints that Danto’s emphasis on the retrospective view of the historian downplays the 
role of the views of eyewitnesses and historical agents. D. Carr “Place and Time: On the 
Interplay of Historical Points of View”, History and Theory 40 (2001), 153–167, there 166. I do 
not think it does. The viewpoint of the agent and that of the historian difffer radically, con-
trary to what Carr thinks. The agent views the reality that surrounds him. The historian aims 
to understand the history of past reality. The history of past reality is however not part of 
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The nineteenth century historicist may have argued that these social 
changes are inherent in the individuals who lived in the past themselves 
and that they should somehow be abstracted from all that we can say about 
them, as Wilhelm von Humboldt maintains.15 A feature of narrativist phi-
losophy of history is to situate such abstractions on the level of the narra-
tive instead of on that of past reality, as Ankersmit argues. Historical ideas 
or forms are part of the historian’s language.16 The historicists were right 
that the nature of a thing lies in its history, as long as we do not identify his-
tory with the past but with its retrospective understanding as expressed in 
a narrative.
The double character of the notion of individuality17 in historicism – the 
notion applies to individual human beings and to individual states and 
nations – can still be attained. Of both it is true that their identity is their 
history, that is, to know the nature of some individuality, one has to under-
stand that individuality historically. I emphasize this because Danto’s claim 
that social change is a change in society as illustrated by the behaviour of 
individuals, suggests that individuals belong to the realm of reality while 
societies belong to the realm of narrative. But that is not what I (or Danto) 
have been arguing for. We must make a diffference between aspects of social 
reality and the historical understanding of such aspects. The point is that 
we can only know what a certain aspect of social reality is (an individual 
human being, a state or nation, or a social condition such as poverty) if we 
understand it historically, and this historical understanding is typically 
expressed in a narrative. 
At the start of our discussion I said that the question whether social indi-
viduals exist or not would be answered by Danto’s analysis of social change 
in historical narratives. That discussion warrants the conclusion that social 
individuals exist as historical entities (e.g. the Thirty Years War, France, 
libertines), that is, as products of historical understanding. Of course, we 
past reality. Therefore it could never have been part of the viewpoint of the historical agent. 
See also section 4 below.
15) W. von Humboldt, “On the Historian’s Task”, History and Theory 6 (1967), 55–71, there 65.
16) Ankersmit, “The Necessity of Historicism”, Journal of the Philosophy of History (2010) 
226–240, there 237. See also his Narrative Logic. A semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Lan-
guage (The Hague: Martinus Nijhofff Publishers, 1983), 114.
17) J. Bos, “Individuality and interpretation in nineteenth-century German historicism”, 
U. Feest ed., Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen, (Dordrecht: Springer Science 
+ Business Media B.V., 2010), 207–220, there 209.
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may still, apart from this, refer to social entities in the sense given to it 
above: as statements about individual human beings of which the social 
individual consists that cannot be stated by referring to those individual 
human beings individually. So individual human beings and social entities 
may be said to have existed in the past. Their history however does not.
Social change, the primary concern of most historians, is illustrated by 
individual human beings. The diffference between referring to individuals, 
their behaviour and attitudes, to “illustrate” social change, and referring to 
individuals in order to “provide evidence” for social change, can now be 
made clear. If reference to individuals is made to illustrate social change, 
the history of an aspect of social reality is at stake, while if reference to 
individuals is made to provide evidence of social change, the identifĳication 
of an aspect of social reality is at stake.
More needs to be said on this diffference. It will be a central theme in the 
rest of this essay. For now the following distinctions sufffĳice. If a state of 
afffairs x illustrates a social change, then x is understood historically (in terms 
of the social change it illustrates). The state of afffairs x is in this sense a his-
torical entity: a product of historical understanding. If a state of afffairs x is 
evidence for a social change, then x justifĳies the claim that the social change 
in fact took place. The state of afffairs x is then an identifĳied aspect of social 
reality. In terms of philosophical semantics we may say the following. A 
state of afffairs x is a historical entity if it illustrates or exemplifĳies that 
change, whereas a state of afffairs x is an aspect of social reality if it can be 
referred to by a statement that can be empirically justifĳied. So the painting 
of Watteau is a proto-Enlightenment-painting because it illustrates the 
proto-Enlightenment. We may wonder whether the painting can also be 
used as evidence for the existence of the proto-Enlightenment. Does the 
painting justify that there was a proto-Enlightenment? The answer is that it 
does not. Danto maintained that changes in society cannot be observed in 
individuals and their behaviour at the time of their emergence. Their behav-
iour and attitudes may only illustrate social change. No one could observe 
that Watteau’s libertinism was anticipating the eighteenth century’s Enlight-
enment. Watteau’s painting may be evidence of his libertine outlook, but it 
is not evidence of the history of his libertine outlook and the events it is con-
nected with. That history is only illustrated by such things as his painting. 
Because the painting illustrates the proto-Enlightenment, we are able to 
make the true statement that Watteau’s painting is a proto-Enlightenment 
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painting. The painting acquired this property as the result of Cowart’s retro-
spective understanding; it is not a property of the painting to be found by 
the historian in the past itself. 
The question whether the change from a religious conflict to a political 
one was a change of the Thirty Years War or a change in the Thirty Years 
can now be answered. In a sense the Thirty Years War changed itself: it 
changed from a religious conflict into a political conflict. In another sense, 
however, the change happened in the Thirty Years War: individual human 
beings living during that time interval illustrate the change. In both these 
senses, the Thirty Years War is a social individual that is known in terms of 
the history that can be told about it.
To sum up: individuals illustrate social changes. These social changes are 
not part of the past; they are the result of the retrospective view of the his-
torian. This led to the question how this can be so since societies are no 
doubt part of past reality. The answer was that individuals, individual 
human beings and individuals such as societies, are part of the past but 
their histories are not. History is, as Danto puts it, made by historians: it is 
autonomous with regard to the past itself.
2. Mink: Ingredient Conclusions and the Autonomy of History
In his “The Autonomy of Historical Understanding”, Mink argues, among 
other things, that the conclusions (theses) of historical narratives are insepa-
rable from the events mentioned in those narratives. This is what the writing 
of history demarcates from the other sciences, where conclusions are detach-
able from the represented empirical content. We already encountered this 
non-detachable quality of historical conclusions before. The distinction 
between a state of afffairs x illustrating social change and referring to a state 
of afffairs x to provide evidence for social change is another way of formulat-
ing Mink’s distinction between the writing of history and the other sciences. 
Cowart uses Watteau’s painting to illustrate the proto-Enlightenment, not to 
provide evidence for the proto-Enlightenment, since, as we have argued, 
what Watteau’s painting illustrates could not have been observed as such. 
Obviously, as a proto-Enlightenment-painting (i.e. an historical entity, a 
product of historical understanding), Watteau’s painting cannot be sepa-
rated from the proto-Enlightenment it illustrates. Similarly, the change from 
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a religious to a primarily political conflict during the Thirty Years War can-
not be separated from the individuals illustrating that change. As illustrating 
(exemplifying) entities they are historical entities and as such they are non-
detachable from the thesis they exemplify. Mink writes:
The signifĳicant conclusions, one might say, are ingredient in the argument 
itself, not merely in the sense that they are scattered through the text but in 
the sense that they are represented by the narrative order itself. As ingredient 
conclusions they are exhibited rather than demonstrated. Articulated as sepa-
rate statements in a grand fĳinale, they are not conclusions but reminders to 
the reader (and to the historian himself) of the topography of events to which 
the entire narrative has given order. In this one respect at least, history is akin 
to poetry in its reliance on ingredient rather than detachable conclusions.18 
In this quotation from Mink we fĳind the meaning of “illustration” that we 
had been looking for all along. Historians exhibit rather than demonstrate 
their conclusions. States of afffairs in the past do not constitute the empiri-
cal content of the narrative used to demonstrate historical conclusions. The 
states of afffairs mentioned in the narrative exemplify (illustrate or exhibit) 
the historical conclusions of that narrative. The historian is looking for a 
comprehensive synthesis.19 Therefore the conclusion cannot be separated 
from the events mentioned in the narrative. The conclusion that the Thirty 
Years War changed from a primarily religious to a primarily political con-
flict cannot be separated from the individuals who – without perhaps even 
intending or knowing about that change – illustrate that change. Similarly, 
the conclusion that in late seventeenth century France a libertine outlook 
anticipated the eighteenth century Enlightenment cannot be separated 
from the events exemplifying that outlook. What exemplifĳies cannot be 
separated from what is exemplifĳied in the way that empirical content can 
be separated from the conclusion it supports. If Watteau’s painting stops 
exemplifying the proto-Enlightenment, then the painting will no longer be 
a proto-Enlightenment painting. Whereas if the painting demonstrates the 
conclusion that a recurring theme of Watteau’s paintings is the depiction of 
people coming from diffferent social classes, the painting and the conclu-
18) L.O. Mink, “The Autonomy of Historical Understanding”, History and Theory, 5 (1966), 
24–47, there 39.
19) Mink, “The Autonomy”, 40.
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sion are detachable. The painting does not stop depicting people from dif-
ferent social backgrounds if the conclusion turns out to be false. The 
conclusion that the late seventeenth century was a period of proto-Enlight-
enment, in contrast, is not true or false: it is exhibited in a narrative or not.
With the distinction between exhibiting and demonstrating we enter 
the heart of narrativist philosophy of history. The historian may start with 
studying an aspect of social reality such as poverty, social classes, inequal-
ity, states, revolutions, and so on, but she will end up with an autonomous 
historical narrative in which past states of afffairs exhibit a thesis on for 
example poverty. Ending up with an autonomous historical narrative is 
precisely what makes a historian a historian rather than a social scientist. 
The narrativist philosophy of Mink thus leads to the same conclusion as 
that of Danto. History is made by historians; it is autonomous with regard 
to the past.
We may easily confuse terms with their history. The term “poverty” may 
refer to social reality in general and the phrase “poverty in nineteenth cen-
tury London” may refer to the social reality of nineteenth century London 
in particular. The “history of poverty”, however, refers to the historical 
understanding of poverty as provided by an historian. The same term (e.g. 
“poverty”) may thus be used diffferently. From this it follows that one cannot 
prove that the term “poverty” refers to a certain state of afffairs in reality. One 
can only use the term “poverty” in that way. Therefore one cannot refute the 
narrativist philosopher of history’s claim of the autonomy of the history of 
poverty with regard to past reality with an appeal to the argument that the 
meaning of the term “poverty” is defĳined or fĳixed by social reality itself. One 
would only be proving that a term can be used in a certain way.
With Mink we have taken a second step in arguing for the exemplifĳica-
tion theory of history. The conclusions (theses) of a historical narrative 
cannot be separated from the past as represented in that narrative: they are 
exhibited rather than demonstrated. In addition we made a distinction 
between the history of x and the identifĳication of x and argued that the his-
tory of x is to be found in historical narratives. 
3. Ankersmit: History and Identiﬁcation
The distinction between the history of x and the identifĳication of x may be 
said to be what narrativist philosophy of history is all about. This is  especially 
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true of the narrativist philosophy of Ankersmit. First I will relate some cen-
tral aspects of his philosophy to what has already been said on the philoso-
phies of Danto and Mink. Then I will focus on the distinction between the 
history of x and the identifĳication of x and argue that the identifĳication of x 
is made possible by having the history of x. This will, fĳinally, lead to a proper 
understanding of the exemplifĳication theory of history as proposed in this 
essay.
Ankersmit follows Mink in emphasizing the autonomy of historical 
understanding:20 
The narratio is not the projection of a historical landscape or of some histori-
cal machinery; the past is only constituted in the narratio. The structure of the 
narratio is a structure lent to or pressed on the past and not the reflection of a 
kindred structure objectively present in the past itself. We should reject “the 
idea that there is a determinate historical actuality, the complex referent of all 
our narratives of “what actually happened”, the untold story to which narrative 
histories approximate (Mink).21 
To be sure, the proposition that the structure of historical narratives is 
something lent to or pressed onto the past does not imply that the historian 
can invent events, human beings, their behaviour, and so on. If that would 
be the case, history would be no diffferent from fĳiction. Ankersmit does not 
deny that past events were once present, nor does he deny that historians 
should do their utmost best to accurately represent the past.22 However, as 
Danto already pointed out, the historical meaning or signifĳicance of past 
states of afffairs depends on the narrative of the historian. Or, as Ankersmit 
puts it, narratives embody historical interpretations.23 History is made by 
historians: it is the product of their retrospective understanding. 
20) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 7.
21)  Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 81. The reference to Mink is to his “Narrative form as a cogni-
tive instrument” in: R.H. Canary and H. Kozicki eds., The writing of history. Literary form and 
historical understanding, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 148.
22) “Accuracy” here does not mean “corresponding to state of afffairs” in the sense of the cor-
respondence theory of truth. “Accuracy” must be understood as being in line with the values 
and codes of the historical profession. See on this distinction and its importance: R. Rorty, 
Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers Volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 73–74, and my Beweren en Tonen. Waarheid, Taal en het Verleden (Nijmegen: PhD 
thesis Radboud University, 2009), 103–112. 
23) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 16.
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Ankersmit too argues that the past states of afffairs mentioned by the 
historian in her narrative have an illustrative use.24 Ankersmit uses the term 
“narrative substances” for what we have called “historical theses”. He agrees 
with Mink that historical theses (or conclusions) cannot be separated from 
the events and their order as represented in the narrative, although he 
misses the opportunity to identify Mink’s “ingredient conclusion” with his 
“narrative substance”.25 If we identify Mink’s “ingredient conclusion” with 
Ankersmit’s “narrative substances”, we may understand why narrative sub-
stances can only be identifĳied by a complete enumeration of all the state-
ments it contains.26 To fully understand the historical thesis (conclusion) 
of a narrative, one has to read the entire book. With narrative substances, 
historians “try to convey a maximally clear and consistent representation 
of the past”.27 This again emphasizes the autonomy of historical narratives, 
for the past itself is not clear or unclear, nor consistent or inconsistent, only 
narratives have such qualities.
Ankersmit provides several examples of narrative substances: “intellec-
tual movement”, “Renaissance”, “social group”, “Industrial Revolution”, 
“states”, “revolution”.28 These examples easily lead to misunderstandings. 
So John Zammito, among others, argues:
for most historians, the notion that the ‘historical idea’ [narrative substance] is 
entirely fĳictive, ontologically restricted to the representation and without any 
claim to actuality in the past, goes too far. Poland, however unstable its borders, 
however interrupted by partition, is not just our metaphor: it actually existed 
and we know that. Bourgeoisie may be harder, and Renaissance harder still, but 
the practicing historian’s intuition needs to be taken extremely seriously.29 
“Poland” is indeed a proper name we can use to identify a certain state with. 
But the use of the term “Poland” to refer to a certain country must be distin-
guished from the historical understanding of Poland as expressed in a 
24) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 128.
25) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 46. Ankersmit rightly disagrees with Mink’s conception of 
the narrative as a network of overlapping descriptions (Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 48–49). 
This conception of the narrative is absent in the article of Mink I discuss above. 
26) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 107–110
27) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 104.
28) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 82, 101.
29) J. Zammito, “Ankersmit and Historical Representation”, History and Theory, 44 (2005), 
155–181, there 164.
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narrative. The same is of course true of the terms “bourgeoisie” and “Renais-
sance”. So the issue is not whether terms such as “Poland”, “bourgeoisie”, 
and “Renaissance”, refer to something in past reality: we can use those 
terms for doing that. The issue is, rather, to distinguish between what a 
term refers to and the historical understanding of what the term refers to. 
The historian may start by studying social reality. But, as a historian, she 
will end up writing a narrative expressing the historical understanding of 
social reality. The history of a thing belongs to our understanding of reality 
and should not be confused with reality itself. 
Ankersmit’s narrativist philosophy of history may be said to be all about 
the distinction between the history of x and the identifĳication of x. He holds 
that we can only identify such things as states, revolutions, and social 
classes, if we presuppose them to have a history, that is, a possible narrative 
substance embodying their historical interpretation (and that history need 
of course not be written or read beforehand). Studying the nineteenth cen-
tury Prussian state, for example, only makes sense if that state has a history, 
that is, an existence in time that can be understood retrospectively. If the 
history of x is presupposed in the identifĳication of x, then the history of x 
precedes its identifĳication.30 (This is, obviously, only true of the things we 
can write a history of. Usually, history is written on social individuals such 
as “states”, “revolutions”, “poverty”, and “the Enlightenment”.)31 We can 
only identify social individuals on the condition that they have a history.
The diffference I have in mind here is that between identifying narrative 
substances embodying the history of some aspect of social reality and iden-
tifying some aspect of social reality. We already noted that according to 
Ankersmit the history of x (i.e. its narrative substance) can only be known 
by a complete enumeration of all the statements defĳining what that history 
is. That way the history of x is individuated. The history of a thing is in other 
words its complete notion. The identifĳication of x, on the other hand, 
depends on one or more identifying descriptions.32 Now, the identifĳication 
of x can be said to stand in a part-whole relation to the history of x: we can 
30) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 143–155.
31)    We can write a history of almost everything, perhaps only not of natural kinds such as 
“water” and “air”. It will only be a history in the proper sense if it concerns (social) individu-
als. Books with titles such as “The history of chess” are usually nothing but a chronicle of 
events related to “chess” rather than historical understandings of “chess”.
32) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 110–111.
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identify x because there is a complete notion of x (i.e. its history) that gives 
identifying descriptions their sense. 
In terms of narrative logic Ankersmit argues as follows. A narrative con-
sists of statements on states of afffairs in the past. These statements are 
components of the narrative and as such properties of the narrative sub-
stance (the historical thesis or conclusion).33 All statements (p, q, r etc.) 
contained in a narrative should according to Ankersmit be read as state-
ments on the narrative substance proposed in that narrative (“N is p”, “N is 
q”, “N is r”).34 These statements expressing the properties of narrative sub-
stances are analytical. This is according to Ankersmit the most fundamen-
tal theorem of narrative logic.35 It is also a very precise formulation of what 
Mink calls “ingredient conclusions” and of individuals (as described by p 
etc.) illustrating social change (N is p etc.).
Since every statement contained in a narrative states something about 
the past and at the same time attributes a property to the historical thesis 
proposed in that narrative, they have according to Ankersmit a double 
function: asserting that p (making a statement on a state of afffairs in the 
past) and asserting that N is p (attributing the property of including p to the 
narrative substance proposed in the narrative).36 
I will rephrase this double function of statements37 in terms of the exem-
plifĳication theory of history. I defĳine that theory as follows: if p is a state-
ment on x (a state of afffairs in the past) contained by the historical narrative 
N, then x (as described by p) can be said to exemplify the thesis expressed 
by N. The following passage of Cowart’s The Triumph of Pleasure may illus-
trate all this: 
[i] Perhaps because of their apparent frivolity, the ballets of Campra and his 
collaborators have never been examined as vehicles of social critique or polit-
ical ideology. [ii] Yet a study of their libretti reveals a carefully encoded 
dialogue between the opéra-ballet as a modern fête galante embodying the 
ideals of love, equality, and freedom, and the court ballet of the 1660s as an 
archaic fête monarchique embodying the ideals of absolutism, patriarchy, and 
33) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 94.
34) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 107.
35) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 127.
36) Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 95.
37) Cf. my Beweren en Tonen, 38–42. 
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sovereign praise. (. .) [iii] The public ballet of the Paris Opéra, under the guise 
of a libertinage de moeurs, a social libertinism that is shared with the court bal-
let of Louis’s early reign, also espoused a libertinage d’esprit, a political outlook 
serving as a bridge between seventeenth-century libertinism and eighteenth-
century Enlightenment thought.38
We should focus here on the sentences (ii) and (iii). In (ii) reference is made 
to the libretti of Campra and his collaborators. Their libretti exemplify the 
historical thesis that is expressed in (iii). They are proto-Enlightenment 
things. Danto would say that the libretti illustrate a change in society. Mink 
would say that the libretti are an ingredient and non-detachable part of the 
historical conclusion: they espouse a libertine spirit bridging seventeenth-
century libertinism and eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought. Ank-
ersmit would say that all statements attribute a property to the narrative 
substance that is known as the “proto-Enlightenment”. Here we have in a 
nutshell the exemplifĳication theory of history and the way it is anticipated 
by narrativist philosophers of history.
4. Conclusion: Narrativist Philosophy and the Autonomy of History 
We have emphasized Danto’s argument that the historical signifĳicance of 
events is autonomous with regard to those events themselves. Even a per-
fect witness to an event, knowing all what happens and having access to 
the minds of all participants, could have no knowledge of the historical 
signifĳicance of that event. It is up to the historian to make history. Only she 
can determine what the historical signifĳicance of an event is. Or, as Mink 
would have it, it is the historian who write histories by “seeing things 
together” and by providing a “comprehensive synthesis”.39 They do so by 
exhibiting their conclusions. Ankersmit, as we have seen, contends that the 
past has no narrative structure. The narrative is no mirror image of the past 
as it has been in itself, it is no inventory aiming at completeness, as Danto 
would have it. The narrative has a substance of its own, embodying the 
historian’s interpretation of some part of the past.
38) Cowart, The Triumph of Pleasure, 167–168.
39) Mink, “The Autonomy”, 42–44.
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Narrativist philosophy of history is all about the distinction between the 
history of x and the identifĳication of x. Danto, Mink, and Ankersmit, address 
this issue in similar ways that mutually support each other. We can always 
make a distinction between concepts that refer to aspects of social reality 
and the history of what those concepts refer to. We should, however, not 
confuse the one with the other. Moreover, if we really want to understand 
what such concepts refer to, we should not start with investigating the past, 
but with reading what historians have written about them. Historical nar-
ratives are better guides to the past than the past itself will ever be. 
Throughout this article it is maintained that history is autonomous with 
regard to the past. The history of x refers to the historical understanding of 
x as expressed in a narrative. The existence of individuals in time and what 
they have been through, the res gestae, is only understood as history in ret-
rospect, as historia rerum gestarum the moment it exemplifĳies a historical 
thesis. The exemplifĳication theory of history thus explains both the transi-
tion from res gestae to historia rerum gestarum and the autonomy of the 
latter with regard to the former. History is not part of the past; it is an 
autonomous mode of understanding the past. This is what is meant by the 
autonomy of history.
Past events illustrating a particular historical thesis are of course not 
stumbled upon. The historian studying the past should try to understand 
past events retrospectively. By studying individual human beings, their 
behaviour, attitudes and beliefs, in light of possible social changes that go 
beyond their intentions, she will eventually move away from past reality 
into the direction of a historical thesis. The better she retrospectively 
understands past reality, the better it is clear to her which past states of 
afffairs exemplify the historical thesis. When Cowart studied Watteau’s 
painting, she did not discover that his painting was a proto-Enlighten-
ment painting. Only as the result of her retrospective understanding did 
the painting acquire the property of being a proto-Enlightenment paint-
ing. Moreover, the possibility of such historical understanding was her 
guide when studying late seventeenth century France. Historicity, as 
Ankersmit argued, precedes identifĳication.
We may now understand why the narrativist philosophy of history of 
Danto, Mink, and Ankersmit, may be called Platonic. Historical narratives 
do not reflect reality; it is precisely the other way around: reality reflects the 
narrative. To grasp past reality, one has to study it historically rather than 
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empirically. After all, the history of x cannot be found in the past itself; it is 
an autonomous idea or form, providing the past with its historical mean-
ing. Without such historical ideas, past states of afffairs could never acquire 
historical signifĳicance. Therefore we should give priority to those ideas 
above reality itself when discussing the relationship between historical 
narratives and the past. To know what past social reality is like, one, para-
doxically, has to move away from it.
On the other hand, the narrativist philosophy of history of authors like 
Paul Ricoeur and David Carr may be characterized as Aristotelian.40 They 
deny the autonomy of historical narratives. Instead they focus on the 
understanding of action of historical agents which provides them with 
their model of narrative. As they insist, to understand human action is, 
basically, to recognize its temporal structure. Actions have a pre-narrative 
structure, a temporal structure “that call for narration”, according to 
Ricoeur.41 Carr sees a similarity between the motives-means-end structure 
of action and the beginning-middle-end structure of narratives.42 Narrative 
is thus modelled on action. The historian’s own practical knowledge, 
assembled through years of experience, enables him to move from the his-
torical agent’s action to its explanation as presented by the narrative. The 
historian’s life experience then functions as a translation-rule, tying the 
historical agent’s action to the narrative told about it. Danto, Mink, and 
Ankersmit, reject such translation-rules, since they are at odds with the 
autonomy they claim for narrative. 
Ankersmit argues that in hermeneutic theory the life-experience of the 
historian “constitutes the translation rules that enable him to understand 
and describe the past”.43 Indeed, according to the Aristotelian view, narra-
tives are a mimesis of action. Danto emphasizes the limitations on the scope 
of Verstehen entailed by the fact that the historical signifĳicance of an event 
can never be seen or witnessed by those living through that event.44 Finally, 
Mink observes that understanding events is not “reliving them in a serial 
40) Carr relates his narrativist philosophy explicitly to Aristotle in his “Narrative and the 
Real World”, 126. Ricoeur places Aristotle’s theory of the muthos as the mimesis of action as 
developed in his Poetics at the center of his narrativist philosophy in his Time and Narrative, 
Vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 31 fff.
41)    Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, especially 59, 64, and 74.
42)  Carr, “Narrative and the Real World”, 122.
43)   Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 79.
44) Danto, Narration, 169.
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order”; it is to hold them together in one thought, in an “act of judgment” 
which “no one could experience together”. It is therefore of no use to try to 
relive those events in their serial order.45
Carr holds that according to the autonomy thesis – or “discontinuity the-
sis” as he calls it –, narratives distort reality.46 The autonomy thesis, how-
ever, does not imply this. For if the history of aspects of social reality are not 
part of reality, then how could a retrospective understanding of reality dis-
tort that reality? Narratives do not distort reality: they help us understand 
it. Carr also believes that, according to the autonomy thesis, reality is a 
meaningless sequence.47 But the autonomy thesis as defended here does 
not imply this conception of reality (although I readily admit that such a 
conception can be found in some unwarranted passages of the proponents 
of the autonomy thesis). Past events will no doubt have had a meaning for 
the people living through those events. But that could not have been an 
historical meaning. (It is sometimes said of a current event that it is “his-
torical”. Such statement only makes sense if it is understood as a prediction 
about future retrospective views). The autonomy thesis does not so much 
contradict phenomenological hermeneutics, as Carr believes it does, it 
argues for the fundamental limits of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics with its 
focus on the agent’s point of view cannot account for the history of the 
events that the agent has lived through. The autonomy thesis does not con-
tradict, as Carr puts it, that “events are charged with the signifĳicance they 
derive from our retentions and pretensions”. Nor does it imply, as Carr 
believes it does, that life is a “mere sequence”.48 We may agree with Carr on 
both these matters without contradicting anything we have said on the 
autonomy thesis, for the autonomy thesis is about the retrospective under-
standing of the events that agents may have lived through; it is not a thesis 
about their experience of life. Therefore we cannot agree with the follow-
ing. Carr argues that “It is not only novelists and historians who view events 
in terms of their relation to later events, to use Danto’s formulation of the 
narrative point of view; we all do it all the time, in everyday life”.49 So much 
is certainly true, but this is irrelevant in the present context, for the point of 
my argument is not only (to take up that example again) that Watteau in 
45) Mink, “The Autonomy”, 43–44.
46) Carr, “Narrative and the Real World”, 117. See also Carr, “Time and Place”, 165.
47) Carr, “Narrative and the Real World”, 121.
48) Carr, “Narrative and the Real World”, 122.
49) Carr, “Narrative and the Real World”, 125.
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1718 did not know what the Enlightenment was going to be like, but that 
historians writing about such large-scale events as the Enlightenment 
express a historical thesis that is exemplifĳied by individual human beings. 
If Carr would have his way, historians would be chroniclers making inven-
tories of the past only (albeit with special attention given to the agent’s 
point of view). 
I will now come to some fĳinal observations. We may wonder whether the 
exemplifĳication theory of history resembles what is known as the “exem-
plar theory of history”. This pre-historicist theory of history, the dominant 
theory of history from antiquity until the eighteenth century, was didactic 
in purpose, an instrument of political education50 and a “storehouse of 
vicarious experience from which to derive examples of behaviours both to 
imitate and to avoid”.51 As against this view, nineteenth century historicists 
such as Humboldt argued that it was not up to history to have examples 
told what to do and what to avoid. History’s usefulness was to be found in 
“its power to enliven and refĳine our sense of acting on reality, and this 
occurs more through the form attached to events than through events 
themselves”.52 The pre-historicists exempla as directions for future actions 
were abandoned for events embodying historical forms or ideas. Twentieth 
century narrative philosophy of history restated historicism, at least 
Ankersmit explicitly did so: historical forms or ideas belong to the autono-
mous level of the historical narrative. From that perspective there is, indeed, 
no resemblance between the exemplar theory and the exemplifĳication the-
ory. Nevertheless, there is one striking and obvious resemblance. For in 
both theories past state of afffairs are examples: in the exemplar theory 
examples are given of what to do and what to avoid, in the exemplifĳication 
theory past states of afffairs are examples of the historical thesis they 
 exemplify. So whereas historicism was a search for the historical forms 
inherent in the events themselves, depriving them from their exemplary 
function, narrative philosophy revitalized those forms by relocating them 
on the level of historical understanding as expressed in the narrative, 
50) G.H. Nadel, “Philosophy of History before Historicism”, History and Theory 3 (1964), 
291–315, there 294.
51) A. Blair “Historia in Zwinger’s Theatrum humanae vitae”, Empiricism and Erudition in 
Early Modern Europe, ed. G. Pomata and N.G. Siraisi (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2005), 269–296, there 269.
52) Humboldt, “Historian’s Task”, 60.
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returning thus to events the exemplary function they were suppose to have 
lost, however, not as exempla for future actions, but as exempla of histori-
cal theses, the forms the historicist had been so much eager to fĳind. These 
historical theses may indeed, as Humboldt stated, “enliven and refĳine our 
sense of acting on reality”.
One last observation. The exemplifĳication theory of history does not lead 
to a false opposition between life and narrative. Narratives do not distort 
life. Nor should they be viewed as an extension or continuation of life, as 
Carr does, or as a fulfĳilment of the inchoative narrative quality of life, as is 
the case with Ricoeur. No narrativist philosopher of history would deny 
that history should serve life. The question is how it does. The Platonic view 
on narrative may be our best guide here. The world surrounding us pres-
ents itself to us as a social world, as a world we can identify, describe, 
explain, and quantify. This is how it appears to us. It is the historian’s task 
to lead us out of this world of appearances into the Real.53 
53) This may also explain what Ankersmit calls “historical experience”. While discussing 
Francesco Guardi’s painting Arcade with a Lantern, Ankersmit at some point refers to Rich-
ard Sennet’s The Fall of Public Man in which it is argued that in the eighteenth century “act-
ing” was not just restricted to the theatre; it was part of public life. The need to integrate 
these respective roles into one substratum was not felt. The fact that public life was a theatre 
led to a sentiment of boredom. Guardi’s painting, combining normal life and the theatre on 
his painting, expresses such boredom. The painting brings us according to Ankersmit “right 
into the heart of eighteenth-century public life” (Ankersmit Sublime Historical Experience, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 274–275.) Now, in terms of the exemplifĳication 
theory we should say that Guardi’s painting exemplifĳies or illustrates eighteenth century 
public life (it should be noted that Ankersmit does not seem to be aware of the fact that he 
is referring to a narrative substance, proposed by Sennet. In his De historische ervaring, 
(Groningen: Historische Uitgeverij, 1993), 23, Ankersmit is even more outspoken, and argues 
that Romanticism did integrate the roles played in public into one substratum, an authentic 
self that eventually destroyed the ancien régime – an even more exciting narrative substance 
in need of illustration). Eighteenth century life is a social individual whose history cannot be 
found in the past itself; it can only be illustrated with such things as paintings. Ankersmit 
may have experienced the boredom expressed by the painting, but he could only identify 
the boredom in Guardi’s painting as an eighteenth century sentiment resulting from public 
life being a theatre after retrospectively understanding the painting, as narrativist philoso-
phy dictates. The exemplifĳication theory furthermore explains what Ankersmit means when 
he describes an historical experience as a “direct and immediate encounter with reality” 
(Sublime Historical Experience, 285). This is the encounter we have the moment history 
leads us out of the world of appearances into the Real.
